Infrastructure issues overshadow optimistic policymakers’ plans to rely on Venezuelan oil.

For many years, Washington’s energy security rested on two fundamental pillars: the first was strong domestic production, and the second was strategic petroleum stocks large enough to protect the economy during potential crises. Today, one of these pillars no longer appears as strong as it once was. Although the United States remains the world’s largest oil producer, large-scale withdrawals from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), geopolitical crises, and supply disruptions in recent years have significantly weakened the country’s emergency oil buffer. Recent declines in oil prices may create a perception of market relief. However, lower prices do not always mean higher energy security. The real issue is not how cheap oil is today, but how prepared the United States is for the next energy crisis.

How a Three-Layer Energy System Is Replacing the Old Order

As of 2026, the United States’ energy security architecture has evolved into a complex system in which three distinct layers of stockpiles operate simultaneously: the SPR, commercial inventories, and an often overlooked import-based flow buffer. At this point, a critical question emerges: Does the United States truly maintain a second stock system, meaning an import-supported buffer that becomes active during crises? The answer is not straightforward because US energy security is now defined less by physical storage capacity and more by the flexibility of global supply chains. In other words, the structure referred to here is not physical storage but rather an indirect buffering mechanism enabled by the ability to redirect import flows during periods of crisis. 

To understand whether such a system exists, two fundamental questions must be asked. First, can the United States rapidly increase imports during crisis periods? Second, does the global oil market possess sufficient flexibility to meet US demand? 

The United States’ key advantage lies in its access to a highly diversified supplier base. Oil flows from Canada, Latin America, the Middle East, and West Africa are all integrated into the US refining system. This diversification allows alternative supply channels to come online during disruptions. However, this does not constitute a true stockpile. A stock refers to physically stored barrels of oil, whereas an import buffer is entirely dependent on timing, logistics, and market flexibility.

Why the SPR Is No Longer a Sufficient Shock Absorber

The SPR has long been considered the cornerstone of US energy security. However, the large withdrawals following 2022 revealed the structural limitations of this system. According to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), approximately 180 million barrels were released from the SPR in 2022. At the same time, SPR levels have declined to approximately 340 million barrels as of 2026, reaching one of the lowest levels since 2022. If SPR levels decline further, the question of what will replace its crisis response function becomes increasingly important. At this point, the concept of an import-based stock buffer becomes more relevant.

How Venezuela and Chevron PDVSA Are Marginal Stabilizers in a Volatile System

Within this broader framework, the Chevron-Petróleos de Venezuela S.A (PDVSA) partnership operates not as a core pillar of US energy security but as a peripheral stabilizer. Here, Chevron refers to Chevron Corporation, and PDVSA signifies the Venezuelan state-owned oil company. Venezuelan crude flows directed toward the United States fluctuate between 100,000 and 230,000 barrels per day. While this represents a relatively small share of total US consumption, its importance is not derived from volume but from crude quality compatibility. Venezuela’s heavy and high-sulfur crude matches the configuration of US Gulf Coast refineries, which have been optimized for this type of feedstock over many years. This system thus raises the importance of import-based flexibility while limiting the United States’ ability to respond through physical stock intervention. Therefore, the Venezuela-Chevron-PDVSA relationship should be focused on optimizing compatibility, not necessarily be seen as a dependable source. In other words, the core challenge for Washington is that energy security is no longer defined solely by production or storage, but by whether the right crude can be delivered to the right refinery at the right time under volatile conditions.

Why Technical Reality Overshadows Policy Optimism in the Venezuela Debate

US Energy Secretary Chris Wright’s assessments of Venezuelan oil and global supply shocks indicate that policy circles emphasize Venezuela’s potential production growth and its contribution to heavy crude supply. However, technical institutions and market analysis present a more cautious view of its short-term balancing capacity. Wright has noted that Venezuela’s production capacity has potential for short and medium-term growth, and that Chevron’s operations in the region could provide technically fast deployable capacity. The technical counterpart to this view is framed more cautiously by the EIA. In its Venezuela country analysis, the EIA states that although the country holds the world’s largest proven oil reserves, its production capacity remains severely constrained due to years of underinvestment, infrastructure deterioration, and operational fragility. This assessment recognizes Venezuela’s strategic importance but does not position it as a short-term crisis balancing mechanism.

The International Energy Agency (IEA) approaches the issue from a broader systemic perspective. According to the IEA, the global oil market no longer operates through a single center of balance, but rather through a distributed system shaped by inventories, trade flows, and multiple producing countries. From a private-sector perspective, firms such as Rystad Energy describe Venezuela’s production potential as technically recoverable but constrained by significant structural bottlenecks. According to Rystad’s assessments, production increases in Venezuela are technically feasible; however, they are not materializing at a sustainable pace due to deteriorating infrastructure, chronic underinvestment, and elevated above-ground risks, including geopolitical uncertainty and institutional instability. From Chevron’s perspective, Venezuela’s importance is defined entirely through refinery compatibility. In the company’s operational and investor assessments, Venezuelan heavy crude is described as valuable to US Gulf Coast refineries, but not in a volume sufficient to alter global supply balances. Chevron’s production in Venezuela is therefore viewed not as a structural dependency for the energy system, but as a complementary flow that supports refinery optimization.

How Should the United States Approach Energy with Venezuela?

Across all these expert views, the common conclusion is clear. While policymakers in Washington view Venezuela as a partner with production growth potential, technical institutions such as the EIA and IEA adopt a more cautious framework regarding its ability to balance short-term supply shocks. Private sector analysis similarly classifies Venezuela as a technically valuable but operationally fragile source.

Therefore, President Donald Trump’s approach of viewing Venezuela as a source capable of independently offsetting global supply shocks would not be a correct interpretation. A more accurate reading is that increasing Venezuelan production could contribute to global supply shocks flexibility, however it is not considered a capacity capable of balancing global supply shocks on its own.

About the Author: Gökçe Nur Ataman 

Gökçe Nur Ataman is an energy analyst and columnist specializing in natural gas, LNG markets, hydrogen economics, and US energy markets. She conducts academic research on the impact of hydrogen on industrial transformation, with a particular focus on Europe and Turkey. Her work analyzes global LNG trade dynamics, contract architecture, energy security, and geopolitical risk, particularly in relation to US LNG strategy, Henry Hub pricing structures, and transatlantic energy relations. Ataman’s research explores the intersection of energy markets and strategic policy, with a focus on supply security, long-term contracting models, and the evolving global energy order.

The post What Trump Does Not Understand About Venezuela’s Role in US Energy Security appeared first on The National Interest.

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